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I~ has long been a contenU.on of underdeveloped countri.f~S cmd even of relatively developed ones, that th~ emign1tion of hinhly ~k:i.lled personnel constttutes a serious loss which the country sho;,,tlcl try to mi.n:l.m:i.ze. While the idea has seldom been expressed in highly theoretical terms, most peotile have accepted it intuitively and hnrdly questioned the underlying theory.
Recently, however, the. generally acceptec1 point of: vim; has been called 5.nto question by Grubel and Scott, 1 who argue that under rnost circuuistnnces t:here is no lo_ss to the non··migrants as a result of emraigration, even of highly sk:qled pen1onnel, from a given country.
The present discussion attempts to analyze .in considerable detai:I. the . conditions uncle:::-which loss to the remaining popuJ.ation?. will occur, coni~~ring the pcssibility of e~i3~ation eith~r of 6killed n~ v~skl~]~d l~bo~.
It is concluded that, in general, loss does o~cur, although there are ~ few ~ases where gain (or no chan~e)· may result.
In the firs£ case discussed, ~t is assumed thEt the emigration is a once and for all affair and that the supply of resources to the domestic cco., ncmy is perfectly inelastic. Because of the latter assrirnption, this case may be thought of as referring to the very short run,. in which resource .
. sep:_:ilies do not adjust to the itnpact of the migratiou. It is a relatively ·-·-'··-j_G~ub~l:·-H~rbe;t B. and Anthony D. Scott, "The Internat:l.onal Fl mt of ·.Human Ca pi tc.l, 11 Arri~d.~~~~£..~.~m1:i.c Re_vie_'il, }fay 1966. 2It is assmLte::l that the emizrants theuselves gain from the move; the welfare function with whi~h we are concerned deals solely with non-migrants and disregr.:rJs an individu<tl as soon as he migrates, · Problems are irr.pJ.ic.it in this definition but we will not go into detail about them, Since the emigrants are excluded from the national welfare function, it is particularly necess~ry to assume away interpersonal. utility effects betmC!en e~1igrants and their friends or fanili.es who do noi.: emigrc;te. Al tiw•.i5;i1 viit~ally 211 of cons~raer theory is ba~ed on the ~ssu~~iicm of indepzndent utility functions, such an assumption may ·bs pariicul~~l.y ill-suited to the analysis of the 1uestion at hand, and ~ill be relaxed in this paper.· -2-simple case; the major determinarits of the extent of gain or loss are (a) the ratio of per cent of all capital held by emigrants to per cent of all labor supplied by emigrants, and (b) the amount of their physical capital which the emigrants take with them. It is clear also that srich things as the existence of: external effects related to the emig:rants, or increasing returns to scale, can affect the results but the only interesting question is whether such effects are quantitatively importa_nt, since their d:trect:l.ort is theoretically obviow; .. The analysis becomes more complex when readjustment of factor supplies and factor proportions to the migration is allowed for. If there are only two factors, the results depend on the relative scvings propensities of emi·· grants an~1 non~emigrants, and on whether the ernigr;u1ts take their capital with th~n or not. Results are suwnarize<l in Table 2 , farther on. When there are three or more factors (permitting the distinction between skilled and unskilled labor) the result depends jointly on the relative savings propensities,_ the skill levels of migrants and non-migr~nts, the ease of transforming unskillE:d into skilled labor, and the existence of government subsidies to education.
·The Short-Run Effects of Emigration -----:----:-.--_-:-.._..,. ___ ... __ . --To initir.te the-an~ly~is in the sihti)le-st possUile framework assum-'.:! the following: perfect markets, no external effects, constant returns to scale, I independent utility functions (:i.n the sense that one person's indifference level. does not affect that of another person), and a two-factor world, in -3-which.one factor is capital and the other is homogeneous labor. Factors are continuously substitutable and prices are flexible so that factor markets a;:e always cleared. The marginal utility of income is assumed to be equal for all owners of factors of production.
The effects of an emigration on the income of the non-emigrants depends · on the way in which the ownership of the capital stock is distributed among· the people in the country, and whether the emierants tc:ike their phys:i.cal capital with them or receive instead the remuneration corresponding to the return on physical capital, which they leave behind thE!m.
Assume fhst the simplest possible case in which none of the laborers who miorate own any of the capital stock. Here it is clear that as long as
• 0 the rna;:ginal physical productivity of labor is declining, the individuals left in the country after the migration are worse off than they were before it. ·This is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure I , The marginal phys~c<Jl p:roduct ·of labor curve is designated by MPPL,·and the initial labor stock, measured on the horizoi1tal axis, is OL1. Total product is given by the area benecith the marginal physical product of labor _curve, i.e., OACL1. Suppose now that L 2 L 1 workers emigrate reducing the labor force to OL2.
The new total product of the economy is given by the area OL\BL 2 • Hhereas the original equilibrium wage rate was OE, the new and higher wage rate is OF. Since the migrants.ow.n no capital stock, their income1 before migrating is L 2 DcL 1 • The income of the rest of the population at this time is therefore OACDL 2 • After the migration the income of the remaining inhabitants is OABL 2 , less than their original level by the triangle BCD.
Note th~t in this case, the avera~e inccme ·p_Pr pPrsor' 1 ·.n t' t" ...
-5--incr~ases cis a result of the migration, even though the avera~,.;e income:: of that particular set of persons remaining in the co~ntry _is lowered. l This superficial paradox can be explained by the fact that·the emigrants (since they owned no capital) had a below average income level before their migration.
Consider now an alternative in which the· ownership of the capital stoc!'
is equally distributed among all the individuals in the population, each of whom also belongs to the labor force which, as before, is assumed to be homogeneous. Assume also that an individual who lecives the country still owns his cap5.tal and receives the appropriate factor payment. Again we ask our··· selves whether the income per person of the set of individuals remaining in the country is greater before or after the emig~ation, Consider Figure 1 again. Define 11 such that equals l 11
i.e., suppose thRt one nth of the population has decided to emigrate. This tells us that the income of the non-migrating group before the migration occurred was equal to
' where x is equal to the· area OEDLz , z is equal to the nrea ABF , Y is equal to the area_ FBDE , and T is equd to the area BCD • After the migration has occurred the "income of the remaining population is giv~n by X + Y + E:l. (Z) • It is easy to show that the inn come before the migration is in this case less than the income after the ---· r-·-----we assume implicitly throughout this paper that there is a constant r4tio between the labor force and the total population both as between emigrants and non"-emigrants and through time, To the extent that this is not true, conclusions which can be drawn as to the effects on the inco;n~ per worker do not ililply parallel statca12nts as to the e£fects on incor.1e per pe-;_-soct.
The conclusion th6t emigration ian help the remaining population only if the emigrants we;:-e owners of some capital stock, but is sure to hurt the re·· maining population H the emigrants did not hold any capital stock, ·is at first sight rather paradoxical. One might have expected that since the emigration of labor increases the capital labor ratio that the remaining inhabitants wouJ.tj be better off in the latter case. But it is here that the distinction must be carefully 1wde between changes in the income level of the group of people who were in the country before the emigration and st.ill there after it, and clwnges ill the avcrai:;e income level of all ~he people in the countr.y. he.fore the en1:'.-gration and all the people in the country after it. The average income of the people in the country Clt the respective before and after dates does increase lFor this to be true we require only that Y + n-1 (Z) > n-1 (Z + Y + T). ·n n n-1 Subtracting n (Z) from each side we get: which reduces to:
It is obvious from Figure 1 that this inequality holds.
2 The analysis of this section has been based on the assumption that the marginal physical product curve of labor is declining throughout its entire range. It is clear that our conclusion that the non-emigrants are worse off if the emigrants hold no cc=ipit.al stock is not qualified by the shc=ipe of the _ marginal physico.l productivity curve, as long as there is 8.n equilibr.iu2 where the. curv2 is dc;·:rn.i2rd sloping. Since distribution theory b:i:ec;ks. doun if this is not true we can limit ourselves to this case. Hhen the er:iignmts do o>·m the same amount of capital per. p~rson a~ the non-emigrants, the result just. achieved can be re-.;ersed, .even when an e.qu:i.librium exists.
-7-· as a result of the emigration, but this is consistent with a dec:cease in the income of the set of people who remain in the country. Let a = % of all capital stock held by non-emigrants.
Then the incomes of non-emigrants, before migration and after migration respectively, can be represented as folloi·lS:
. before:
after: Given constant returns to scale, whenever a bundle of factors is removed from an economy and the relative amo~nts of the different factors in that bundle are not the same as the relative amounts of the factors in the economy as a whole before the removal, then the average income of the individuals left in the economy after the migration will be lower than it was before; if the relative· proportions are the same, th8 'tVerage incorne of the individuals left in the economy will be unchanged ,2, 3
Applying this pro?o~{tion to the extreme cases, we conclude that if a group of laborers \·iho own no capital stock leaves then there is a decrease in the inco:ne of the remaining population (as we have already sec above); on the other hand, if the entire ~tock of physical cap.itaJ. is removedJ again the aver<"Jge income of the remaining population ts decreased. ·Hore generally, 1 When human capital is introduced its departure along with the basic labor component must clearly be allowed for. In.the case of physical capital, if the emigrant sells a stock, for example, this may lead to a decrease of the country's capital stock in the long run, as stock flotation becomes more expensive. The result, therefore, may be the snmc as if he had "carried" the stoclt off with him. · 2It is assume~ throughout this paper that any non-labor factors which leave the country as a result of t;he migration are owned by the migrants them-• selves.
whenever the labor and capital which leave the economy are not in the scun~ proportion as in the pre-migration economy then there is a decrease in the . i per capita income of the remaining population.l·
The results of this section are surn..111arized in Table 1 .
The Case_ of Hore Than THo Factors
The existence of different types of labor~ or the existence of land as a factor of production changes the analysis to the extent thatiit may no longer be possible to assume that the area under the marginal productivity curve of the factor is equal to the total output. The shape of such a marginal physical productivity curve depends on the extent to which other factors are substitutable for or complementary with the factor in question. If son.1e other type of labor is a very close substitute, then the marginal pro•· cluctiYity cu:cve wUl be relatively .flat. If the factor has no close substitutes, then its marginal physical productivity curve will tend to be more .steeply sloped.
The origina~ conclusions which were drm.;h from Figure I in the case of a homogeneous labor force which owned no capital remain true in the case of any sub-sector of the labor force whose merabe:Ls do not qwn capital. Whenever a non-marginal proportion of this labor force emigrates the loss triangle appears. Someone in the remaining population must be worse off. It is not possible to perform the same simple diagrammatic analysis of the effects on the remaining population if the type of labor that emigrates does indeed own capital; for thL:; one Hould need a more c01:1plicated production function lrt is clear that our results here, as in previous sections, would be ~edified if there were either increasing returns to scale or decreasi.ng returns to scale in the economy. In general, the loss .resulting from ths dcp~rture of any· factor would be greater if there were increa~ing returns ancI less if the:Le were decreasing returns. l"J C:J ~~ u c::
·...! c::
1-1 u c:: Note: "Gain" and "Loss" as elsewhere in this paper, refer only to the non-· emigrants.
-10 approach in which all types of labor and capital were introduced and the effects of the departure of a certain number of a particular type of labor could be calculated. In any c.sse, however, the conceptual apparatus which one must use is relatively clear-cut and sinple. One can assume that th~~e is no bequeathing, in whic~ case individuals will usually save during periods •:hen their incomes are high and dissave in the latter part of their lives. The secie sort of r~lationship between the life-. time pattern of income ancl that of conscmption would presumably hold also where each individual received a bequest from his parents and passed the same amount on to his children. One must make one of these two assumptions of the system would not be a stationary on2. factors, and emigrants do not retain investments in the country after dcpartine, it is ~he relative saving_s propensities of the '.emigrants and non-emigrants which play the role taken in the short-run case by the relative amounts of capital held. The result is analogous; whenever the ~verage saving propensity of the emigrants is different from that of the non-emigrcmts, then the latter lose as a result of the emigration. hssumc that there is no bequeathing so that saving is done only in order to redistribute the pattern of an individual's consumption over his life. If a group does no saving at all, it has a~ over-life consumption pattern identical to its income pattern, A group ~fl1ich saveB has a different patt~rn of incdme and consumption. During the early working years; income is greater than consumption so that net .saving is taking place. During the last years of life dissaving occurs . 1 f;n ahove ctverage savings propensity means that with a given interest rate an individual saves more than the representative individual during his life and by implication, in the case ~hen no bequeathing occurs, dissaves faster during the -latter part ol his life. 2 The absolute amount saved depends on the marginal efficiency of capital,the greater the rate of return on savings in terms of intreased consumption at a later time, the grea~er will usually be the total amount of saving done.3 Thus this case differs from the short run case in that savings (and hence capital formation) are linked to the rate lit: is assmned that net domestic sav:i.ngs fi.nances investment in real capital in the economy (an<l not in other countries) so that the total capital stock at any given time is equal to the total of all net savings to date, 2 1£ bequecithing is done for the economy as a whole, a high savings p1.·o-pensity would be reflected in a high equilibrium level of wealth given the rate of interest.
3rt is true, of course, that there is an income effect as well as a price effect of the chan3es in the rate of interest; hm·1ever, the case where savings are a decreasing function of tbe rat~ of interest i.s not treated here.
of interest so that the capital a person holds is not given exogenously but rather dep~nd.s on market forces. It is still possible, however, to dis-. tinguish high and low savers or capital holders, even when the amounts of capital are not fixed, Suppose that the economy is made up of t~:io equally large sets of indi·· viduals ,. _one of which has a high savings tendency and the other a low one.
In all other respects they are the same. Consider Figure 2 . MPPK is the marginal physical productivity of capital curve. ST is tlxe supply curve of loam1blc funds (or what might be called the "willingness to hold weal th 11 ) from the group with the high propensity to save and VW isthe corresponding curve of the low s<rvers. The equilibrium capital stock is OK 1 and the equilibrium rate of interest is OC ~ The total returns to capital are given by the c:irea designated by OCRK 1 , ·while the rest of the area under the marginal physical productivity of capital.curve corresponds to the remuneration of labor. Now assume, to take a simple case, that all of the high savers emigrate.
Since the curve VH has an intercept above C , the non-emigrants dicl no saving at all before the emigration. Nou with one half ~f the labor having emigrated, the ne\·! marginal physical productivity of capital curve can be designated by MPPK •
The precise relationship between this curve and the original marginal. physical productiyity of capital curve depends on the production function; however, given the assumption of constant returns to scale, it is obvious that if the amount of capital stock were one half of OK1 ,
i.e., OK 2 , then the total product of the economy would be one half of its original level. Hence, the area above the line CR and beneath the Cltrve ... Thus far we have assumed that emigrants have done what is equivalent to taking their capital with them, i.e., they have not retained investments in the country, but have sold them to non-emigrants, thus using up some of the savings of the latter group.
In the case where the two groups have the same savings propensities and the emitrants do not take their physical capital with them, the non-emigrants may be benefited by the emigration. The capital left in the country by the emigrants increases the capital-labor ratio and reduces its own rate of return. The Eituation is illustrated in Figure 4 . One-half of the population has emigrated and the marginal phusical productivity of capital curve and lettering are those of Figure 3 . The supply curve of loanable funds of the ·non-emigrants is given by the line SD , which cuts the marginal physical productivity curve at the point M due to the assumption that the tendency to save is the same for emigrants and non-emigrants. In other words, if none of the emigrants' capital had remained in the country the equilibrium rate of interest WOllld have been at its original level of oc . The income of the non-emigrants, the sum of the wages which accrued to the non-emigrants before emigrationJ (CAH)" and t]1e .gain from their contribution to the capital stock I (SCM) would 1 ikewise have been at its original level. ·That some of the ca pital belonging to the emigrants remains in the country can be represented by the fact that the total supply curve of loanable funds ST' , will lie to the right of SD . The new equilibrium raJ~c of interest is given by OG and the total wage bill accruing to the non-e:nfgrants is nm.; given by the area GAN.
The net gain due to their contribution to the capital stock is now given by
J.
---------------~--------------~
Quantity of Capital SGU • It is obvious that the latter income (SGU + G,\N) is greater than the former (SCVi + CAM:) the difference being the area UNN • Table 2 summarizes the conclusions in this long-run two-factor case.
The Two-Plus Factor Case: Different Labor Skills
·---------------------·--
Consider now the possibility that; emigrants and non-emigrants may differ} not only with respect to savings propensities; but also with respect to skill levels. ·_Unskilled labor can be transformed into skilled labor by educational investment. When the stationary dynamic model, which _is th~ current framework of analysis, is in <lynanic equilibrium, the only investment occLirring in e<lu-.
cation is that required to offset depl2tions in the stock of skilled labor through rei:irerr;ent and death. 1£ the assumptions made throughout the paper (internal factor mobility, perfect markets, etc.), are expanded to include perfect foreslzht and no risk aversion, the transformation of one type of labor into another by means of education would occur automatically up to the point where the benefits and costs accruing ih the future, discounted by the rate of interest, would just equal the current costs of the educational pro- -17-em:igr.ating then the educational sector will have to be larger to make sure that even after the emigration the ratio of skilled labor to unskilled labor and to physical capj_tal is the same as it would be in the absence of the migration, If unskilled labor emigrates) the educational sector will, conv ersely, have to be smaller.
If there are 11 increasing costs 11 l to educating higher and higher proport ions ~f the population (or absolute numbers) to skilled levels, then emigration of skilled workers implies loss to the non-emigrants even in the long run; emigration of unskilled workers implies a gain. These results are reversed if there are decreasing costs in education.
With free capital markets and no risk aver~ion, one wovld expect each individual to take care of his oim education in such a way as to maxiraize his overall discounted productivity. Because individuals are risk ave,:se or lack information, and capital markets are not perfect, it is usually believed that the amount ·of investment in education which would occur without any government assistance would be less than the optimal amount. As a result) the gove~nment intervenes, and gives educational subsidies.
Such a situation suggests in some sense that the loss to the remaining population cis a result of emigration of skilled personnel will be greater 1 In the present context, by increasing costs we mean to include not only the possibility that total costs r_nay rise faster than the r.t.:nber of people educated because of decreasing returns to thQ industry with the innate qu9lity of .students constant (a rather implausible event) but also that as more and more people are educated, the additional students arc less and less suitable and hence do not gain as much fron a givei1 level of educational cost .
...
-18·· than ·it was in the preceding ana~ysis, The emi3ration of an individual who has borne his own educational expenses is one thing;· whatever decrease in consumption had to be sustained in order that he ~e educated was borne by himself. Howe:ver, when a subsidy policy is in effect the decrease in consumption which finances the investment in education is borne to a large degre~ by the population which~iill remain after the emigrant leaves. This particular part of the loss to the remaining population is equal to the total government subsidy gbing into the education of the emigrants.
Interd_gpe~~en_Ll!!.! 1 i ty _Fun~_t_ion~
If each individual is thought of as a unit whose welfare is independent of that of every other individual, then the non-emigrant population as a .
Hhole loses a r;reatcr amount: when the uigrants' e<lu.c<1t:Lon has been ~uIJ.sj_ course, that the extra children who have to be educated as a result of the dep~rture of the emigrants are less suited than the ones educated first, the economy as a whole suffers a loss. This loss possibility has already been considered (increasing costs of education); there is no added loss as lit must be borne in mind that there may be loss due to changed factor proportions, different savings propensities, etc., but that we are here concerned ~nlv with whether there is a further loss.._ due to government subsidization,· 2we assume that the government is, as before, ensurin~ that.optimalnumber of childr.en be educated. It is probable that the non-emigrants would be unwilling to increa.se ·their savings (either directly or through taxes paid • to the government) sufficiently •to maintain the same factor proportions(among physical capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor) as before. Thi.s fact has its own welfare implications, i.e., those already discussed above. The "effective rate" of savings of the group of fa;niJ. ies whose children emigrate will be decreased by the emigration inasmuch as this human capital is lost to the economy, so that the f.;w.ilies of the non-emig.rants would gain or lqse on· this account accorc~ing to whether their savings propensities_ were, respectively: higher or lower than th2 r-0£ the families of the e:rigrants. a result of the fact that government subsidies for education are a feature of the situation.
It is clear that in tho analysis of this problem it is not safe to use the assumption of an independent utility function for each individual. If one assumes that parents receive an increase in utility sufficient to compe~sate them for the costs of educating their children, then the conclusion. that government educational subsidies to people who emigrate result in a loss to the remaining population is not valid. The problem clearly cannot be solved by the use of ecoaornic theory. The implications of the two types of utility functions on the part of th~ emigrants' families are different with respect to the optimal gove~nment educational strategy in a situation where emigration is likely to occur. Hhen the families of the ~migrants <ire paying (in a sense voluntarily) for the education of their children with the government acting as an intermediary (and one form of labor is tr2nsformable into another at constant costs), then the implications for governmental policy are fairly straightforuard. There is no loss to non-emigrants th1:ough subsidies to emigrants no matter how large the educational sector inthe country is or how r:iany people emigrate, (assuming th_at the governmerrt acts with foresight so that it is never caught off-guard by a sudden wave of emigrants).
Independent Utility Functions
The implications for government policy are considerably n~re complicated when the opposite extrea~ assumption is made; nnmely, that the families of the emigrants are just as unwilling to pay for the education of their children as are the families of non-e;::1igY e.nts. Undei.· these assun:ritions and given the possibility of emigration, it may not T)aV ' , the government to give as ...
-21-subsidies as in a situation where emigration does not occur; or conversely, it may pay the government to educate more people'.
To make this analysis n little more pr.ecise, assume that the emigration occurs in response to a w2ge differential between the country in question and countries to which the ~migrants go. The probabili.ty that any one ind:i.-vi.dual will emigrate can be assumed to be an increasing function of this d:i.fferential. Suppose the optimal nnnual production of skilled manpower under the assumption of no emigration is known. Now if emigration occurs and the government continues to subsidize students to the same extent a~ before, the nu~Jer remaining in the country will decrease. The stock of skilled manpower in the country wi.11 become constant at some equilibrium level srnaller than in the closed economy; hence the 'rngc will be higher. The trai.nin,s of .another wod~er would clearly pay off if the government could be sure tbat he would stay in the country, sine~ th~ marginal productivity of this type of labor is now higher than it was in the closed economy and the costs of training are ~resumably the same.1 But if he emigrates early in life then the investment in him is thought of by the government' as being lost. Hhether the 1 rt is assumed that the government is interested in max1m1z1ng the total income of everyone in the economy. ThusJ for education to pay off .it i.s not necessary that it pay off for anyone but the individual on whom the expenditure is incurred. So the sense in which an investment does not pay off if the individual emigrates is simply that with his emigration the governoent's intere~t in him suddenly disappears. This may appea~ to be a rather strange concept but it is implicit in the assumptions which have been made above. The government is, concerned only with the set of ind iv iduals in the country at a point in time, and in discounting future income it concerns itself only with the set of individuals in the country at each given point in the future. So the improvement in the welfare of any individual is counted only as long as he remains in the country.
' I -22-government should now undertake a more or less rapid production of high·· I skilled labor than in -the closed economy depends on the way in which the probability that a worker will emigrate from the country depends on the wage he receives in the country.
The relevant relationships are illustrate-cl diagramatically in Figure 5 . relates the percent of lAlternatively, both costs and benefits could be measured in terms of weeks or months, with the cost then being that weekli or monthly amount which if it had to be p:_ricl over the inclividth:'11 1 s ;;orld.ng life a·nd \-.'ere discour.tec1 to present value would just equal the actual cosf of the education. for thc:it type of labor, the wage diffcrenticl between this country and the rest of the world. Such a policy never pays in the short run. This proposi·-tion is illustrated in Figure 6 (which corresponds to Figure 1 ) where th8 loss to the n~_n-emigra_nts from th_e departure of L 1 L 2 workers is measured by .the trj.angle BCD . The amount which non-migtants would have to pay to ell of these potential migrants to persuade them to remain in the country is given by the rectangular area ACBD Since the area of ACBD is greater than the area of the triangle BCD , the p~licy would cost the nonemigrants more than they would. gain by having· the emigrants remain.
The conclusion derived in the short-run static case does not always hold in the dynamic c<>..s,; where there are government subsidies to eclucc:tion. already has an optimal education sibsidy policy, as defined in Figure S , and as a result, the stock of skilled labor is OL 3 . Without asking whether it is an optimal policy we arbitrarily assume the government subsidizes wages of .skilled labor by an 8mount DDS 1 This shifts the wage differential curve DD' downwards to DsDs' • The original average cost and marginal ----------·---lrt would be possible to discuss the choice of the optimal wage subsidy but ue are here co,1ccrned only \7ith sho;.;ing that sor:1e subsidies can b.e beneficial. ....... Pne might expect that, in a growing econonv, the departure of people with low savings rates would benefit the non-emigrants in a long run sense, even though there might be the usual short run loss. But consider what happens in this case, The rate of return to capital formation will decrease since, because the non-emigrants had a higher-savings ratio than the emigrants, the ratio of labor to capital will now be lower than it would have been had the emigration not occurred and the marginal productivity of any given amount of capital will be lower. He know from our earlier analysis of the dynamic stationary economy that the increase in wages of the nonemigrants is insufficient· to offset the decJ:ease in non-wage incomes. This initial decrease in.income is felt also in the growing economy and coupled with it is a decrease in the return to savings, which will. probably lowe;: the rate of capital formation of the non--emigrants below what it would have had the emigration not occurred. It is true,·~£ course, that the average growth rate of the economy as a whole. will probably be higher after the emigration than before it; but this is just.another example of the apparent paradox first referred to in our short-run analysis above (see page ).
If the emigration had not occurred, the non-emigrants wouLd have gained even faster than they now gain, while the emigrants, having a lower income per capita 'trnuld. have kept the average income per capita down below what it currently is, and would have had a more slowly growing income level.l . 1 It is interesting to ask how our results would be affected if we allo~.;ed for embodied technical change. If the rate of technological progress was an increasing function of total investment in the econor:1y as a whole, it too would be decreased by the emigration, since total investment would be decreased. If, however, the rate of technological progress depended positively on such a variable as the capital-labor ratio, our results could be reversed,
